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NO comparison in modern thought is more strikingly incongru-
ous than the attempt recently made by certain 'literary psy-
chologists' of radical penchant to assimilate the doctrines of Karl
Marx to those of Sigmund Freud. The latest and most dashing
effort to read into Alarx's work an anticipation of current psycho-
analytic myth has been made by Max Eastman in his book on
Marx, Lenin and the Science of Revolution, a chapter of which has
been restated in an article on ]\Iarx and Freud in the July issue of
the New Masses. In this short paper I shall try to make two things
clear: (1) that the theory of psychoanalysis represents the crass-
est violation of fundamental principles of scientific method, and
(2) that the salient ideas of Marx cannot intelligibly be translated
into Freudian terms.
(1) The most formidable objection to the doctrine of psycho-
analysis is that it has absolutely no concepEon of the meaning of
scientific evidence. All of its generalizations are in the nature of
hypothetical explanations after the fact. Instead of being based
on controlled experiment they are merely expressions of facile
guesses and capricious analogies. The psychoanalyst as distinct
from the experimentalist can conceive of no possible evidence
which might disprove his claims. In other words psychoanalysis is
beyond the check of scientific experiment since no matter what
the results of the experiment turn out to be, its theories permit it
to interpret them as confirmatory evidence. Like the theological
notion of the will of God, since it 'explains' the absence of a certain
fact as well as its presence, it is scientifically useless. To give a
simple illustration. I dream that disguised as Santa Claus I come
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down the chimney-flue of the house in which a decrepit great-aunt
of mine Hves. The analysis runs that I have had a suppressed sex
desire for my great aunt (who was fifty years old when I was
born) and am trying to emulate my great-uncle (whom I never
knew). Proof: by a process of 'free' association under the 'expert'
guidance of a follower of Freud I hit upon this explanation and
solemnly declare that I have an intuitive conviction that it is so.
However, if my powers of recall are feeble, the doctor generally
will suggest the above explanation (if he knows his case-books).
Whereupon I burst into laughter and tell him he is either a fool or
a faker. Yet the analysis is still valid, responds the doctor, and
if anything even stronger than if I had given it direct introspective
consent, since my feeble powers of association and my reaction to
his diagnosis simply show how strong the power of my resistance
is,—show that my 'censor' is working full blast trying to save ap-
pearances. In other words I am damned if I confess and damned
if I don't. Examples may be drawn from Eastman's own article.
He says, "The economic interpretation of history is nothing but a
generalized psychoanalysis of the social and political mind." And in
face of the opposition the theory has met, he continues, "One might
infer this (i. e. its truth—S. H.) from the spasmodic and unreason-
able resistance it meets on the part of its patient". Later on he tries
to psychoanalyze the current psychoanalytic interpretation of revo-
lutionary thinking on the ground that as practitioners the psycho-
analysts stand to lose money if the revolutionists have their way.
All this is merely argument ad homineni and as scientific method is
nothing short of puerile. Proceeding in the same way one could
explain every phenomenon in the universe. After the event has
happened one can always account for discrepancies in the results
by introducing subsidiary hypotheses. But just because science
does not read the world backward, the element of prediction (with-
in the limits of error) is a necessary condition of an adequate sci-
entific theory. Bound up with this formal objection is the charge
that psychoanalysis has no definite canons of evaluation in sifting
alleged confirmatory evidence and in establishing correlations be-
tween symbol and meaning.
This brings us to material considerations. The basic fallacy
of psychoanalytic theory is its confusion of motive with stimulus.
An unconscious stimulus may be present and may be used to explain
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an immediate reaction or a dela}ed response, but to speak of ari
unconscious motive is a contradiction in terms. Motive is a cog-
nitive or knowledge term. (There is no such thing as unconscious
or immediate knowledge or inference.) If this is denied, the psy-
choanalyst is bound in all consistency to endow the Unconscious
with greater logical acumen (the Unconscious makes no mistakes)
than our ordinary consciousness possesses. Together with the fact
that the Unconscious automatically expresses its repressed desires
in a complicated symbolism beyond the power of most minds on a
conscious level, we seem to be confronted with another version of
the discredited reminiscence theory of knowledge which is as far
removed from the instrumental theory of knowledge as anything
can possibly be.
As far as the peculiar behavior of psychic aberrants is con-
cerned it may be more plausibly explained as due to the influence
which certain early habit formations and conditioned reflexes ex-
ercise upon later life. Here, at least, is where Watson is talking
sense. But to fall back upon reference to the causal efiiciency of
the unconscious merely represents an uncritical reliance upon a
metaphor. Under the cover of the metaphor it converts the affec-
tive tones of the fringe of consciousness into cognitive attitudes
and purposes 'effecting hidden ends unseen'.
From the point of view of scientific psychology—there is not
a particle of evidence that any of the elaborate Freudian mechan-
isms, such as the censor and the processes of displacement, etc.,
exist in consciousness. In fact, the use of the term force in Freud's
writings—force of repulsion, force of resistance, force of repres-
sion—should arouse suspicion even in the minds of those who do
not forswear animism with such blustering vehemence as does
Eastman, that Freud's psychology is literary rather than scientific,
and smells of the pipe and the armchair rather than of the labora-
tory. At this point, people are sure to interpose with mention of
Freud's clinical cures. The cures are not disputed any more than
the cures wrought by Coue, Christian Science and the miracle
makers. All fakers claim to be justified by occasional cures. But
the question is what is the relation between the theory defended
and the practice followed. If the cure is the result of a technique
which can be verified by other experimenters, then its citation is
relevant. But Freud has not established any direct connection be-
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tween his romantic psychology and his cHnical successes. In addi-
tion, it should be pointed out that Freud's alleged cures may be
more plausibly explained on the basis of a more sober neuro-physi-
ological theor}'. It is interesting to note that a great many psycho-
analysts—notably Brill—hold that the great value of their theory
is prophylactic rather than remedial. But in the absence of logi-
cal evidence one statement is just as gratuitous as the other.
In view of the above, I do not think it too rash to say that
Freud is working his way back to the old fashioned notion of the
soul—the ghost that haunts the mansions of the mind—and that
doctrinally his views are quite compatible with the biological vital-
ism and mysticism of Bergson and Driesch. But we will leave that
theme to be developed some other time.
(2) If it is rank confusion to call the psychology of Freud
scientific, it is sheer intellectual violence to convert the social ob-
jectivism of Alarx into an anticipation of the mystical subjectivism
of Freud. Eastman is able to draw the connection because he
mistakenly believes that historical materialism is a theory which
attempts to account for individual motives rather than for certain
social forces and factors. His conception of historical materialism
boils down despite his frantic efforts to escape from the position,
to the theory that the economic interests of men are primary, and
unconsciously control their activity. This is palpably false. i\Iarx
would never have been able to explain his own life-time of revo-
lutionary activity on the basis of this vulgar theory of self-interest.
Nor would Eastman himself. Surely such a theory can never
plausibly account for the misguided idealism of many workers who
believe that the best way they can serve their country is by laying
down their lives for it. The intense national patriotism of the
working class is not an ideology "indulged in by people controlled
by their own unconscious class interests." Xo, according to the
followers of Alarx, it is the result of a systematic and pernicious
propaganda carried on through the instrumentalities of the press,
the church and the school—that unholy trinity of capitalist civil-
ization. The process is social and objective. The ideas a man
carries in his head are not a function—conscious or unconscious
—
of the cash he carries in his pocket. Eastman's remarks ignore
one of the most patent facts in all history
—
ignorance of what one's
true interests are. And what these true interests are,, is not to be
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found by holding one's nose and prying into the unconscious but
by critical analysis and experience in the class struggle. Eastman
by implication denies this and again falls back upon the 'infallible
unconscious' as the source which inspires and determines the con-
duct of men. He has some inkling of the difficulty when he quali-
fies his statement by saying it is true "on the broad average and
in the long run". But strictly speaking these words state the dif-
ficulty instead of solving the problem which confronts his theory.
In another sense these words contradict his primary assertion for
unless one knows the point of view from which the 'average' is
determined and how far the 'run' extends, one might very well say
that the direct impact of objective economic conditions sets the
limits between which unconscious activities function.
In view of Eastman's continuous invective against the Hegelian
dialectic as both mystical and mysterious, it is instructive to tabu-
late the mystical and mysterious elements in his own thinking.
They enter into his outlook; (a), through the belief that apparently
pure unmotived association of elements in a dream or in everyday
human experience, must of necessity be an expression of desires
which have previously been repressed; (b) through the belief that
the unconscious motives of all the members of a certain class can
be traced to the same repressions; (c) through the belief that the
compensating expression of these repressed desires by a sort of pre-
established harmony give rise to a common class interest. All of
these views are implied in what he says but not an iota of proof is
offered in substantiation. To ridicule Hegel and yet stand com-
mitted to these propositions is straining at a gnat and swallowing
a whole drove of camels.
Without developing in detail the positive argument on the basis
of which the above criticisms and interpretations of Marxism are
made, I suggest the following. Historical materialism takes its
point of departure from the objective existence of an economic
class struggle. In the interests of the struggle, ideas and doctrines
are used as instruments in bringing the issue to a successful com-
pletion. The anticipated efficacy and adequacy of these ideas in
furthering class interests explain their acceptance and use but not
necessarily their genesis or origin. No social factor can wholly
explain the mechanics of individual creation. But only social fac-
tors can explain why once these ideas have seen the light, they
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have been accepted. They are accepted (or rejected) not because
they are in the personal interest of any one individual but because
they are instrumentaHties which are used to accelerate (or retard)
the tendencies of the economic environment in the direction of a
social ideal. Conscious allegiance to a social ideal expresses the
social idealism of the revolutionist. This social ideal is not a mere
possibility of the given nor is it a foregone certainty. It is grounded
in objective tendencies which set the limits of the type and range
of instruments which may be effectively used. jMarxism then turns
out to be a self-critical theory explaining its own acceptance on the
basis of its own principles. It appears in the main as a huge judg-
nient of practice in Dewey's sense of the phrase and its truth or
falsity (instrumental adequacy) is an experimental matter.
But it is a far cry from this to the suppressions of Freud.
There is enough superfluous baggage in the socialist camp
without adding the rotting corpse of a prurient 'bourgeois' (to use
a favorite epithet of Eastman's) psychology, if ever there were
one, to infect the rest of the doctrine.
